l defends two principles of justice by means of an appeal to a hypothetical "original position." However, these principles are strictly principles of justice by and for human beings, or at least by and for persons. Several philosophers have recently argued that tllis argument is flawed-is "speciesist"-in tllat there is no adequate justification for excluding animals from consideration as beings to whom fue principles of justice ought to apply.2 If tllose in tlle original position had to consider tlle possibility tllat tlley might be reborn as a calf ratller than a human, they might well choose different principles. If tlley did not consider that possibility, the original position, and the "veil of ignorance" which helps define it, would fail to protect against prejudice or guarantee fairness and impartiality.
One must be careful to distinguish at fue outset different bases for objecting to the exclusion of nonhuman animals from Rawls's tlleory. One might argue tllat Rawls simply cannot exclude animals from his tlleory, that doing so is internally inconsistent. Alternatively, one might argue that while animals can consistently be excluded, tllere are good reasons for including them. This line of argument might eitller attempt to find tllese good reasons wifuin Rawls's own tlleoretical proclivities (fue second possible strategy) or-a third type ofproject-introduce new fuemes which are independent of, even contrary to, some of Rawls's basic commiunents. On tllis last strategy, one would be arguing tllat fue notion of an original position can be used in contexts ofuer tllan the Rawlsian one to generate a concept of justice tllat wouJld be, in VanDeVeer's terms, "interspecific."3 Of course, all of fuese attacks presuppose fue more basic claim fuat it is logically possible to include animals in the original position.
In tllis paper, I shall only briefly comment on fue argument that inclusion does not lead to logical absurdity; Rawls's critics, most 1l10tably VanDeVeer, are correct in noting tllat tlle original position already has in place tlle mechanisms by which fue interests of animals could be considered in tlle same way as tllose of humans. I shall argue tllat any attempt to force an expansion of fue original position fails, and tllat Rawls is quite justified in restricting Ithe argument so fuat it does not apply to most animals. While the critics apparently take themselves to be engaged in arguments of fue first or second sort, tlley must, at best, content tllemselves witll sometlling like tlle tllird strategy. In order to see why, we must first examine tlle concept of tlle original position and tllen step back for a sense of fue broader context in which talk of fue original position is embedded. The description of Rawls will necessarily be oversimplified, but tlle relevant portions of the argument can be identified.
Rawls argues for his two principles of justice by appealing to "the original position," a hypothetical situation in which "free and equal" individuals choose the principles ofjustice tllat seem to tllem most rational and advantageous-principles to which they would voluntarily accede (TOJ, pp.12-13). To insure impartiality, we must imagine that tllese deliberations take place behind a "veil of ignorance"; the participants have no knowledge of social or economic status, gender, particular talents or abilities, or "particular inclinations and aspirations" (TOJ, p. 18). Rawls claims that individuals in this position would choose tlle following two principles:
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others. Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage and Both principles tell us only about the proper treatment of persons. If 'person' does not include most nonhuman animals, adoption of tllese principles alone would still allow for the most egregious mistreatment of animals, and this gives rise to tlle criticism under consideration. 4 The challenge is most forcefully posed by Donald VanDeVeer, who argues that we can redescribe tlle original position without lapsing into tlle conceptual incoherence of trying to imagine that we have a person, a dog and a pig deciding which principles to choose. Moreover, he argues tllat we must redescribe it in order to guarantee faimess, or else it will fail to function as Rawls intended it to.
People in the original position are envisaged as a fairly sophisticated bunch. They are rational, can recognize a valid argument when one occurs to them, and can grasp complicated economic calculations such as maximin. However, if they knew tllat they would be that clever in "real life," they would tend to choose principles that would give favored treatment to clever people. Thus, tlle veil of ignorance is constructed to preclude that sort of inequality: tllOse in tlle original position must find principles tllat tlley could accept even if they tum out to be ill eqnipped to do moral philosophy.
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This is the point at which VanDeVeer raises his challenge. If people in tlle original position are not allowed to act on the knowledge that they will be "sophisticated reasoners," it seems equally legitimate to insist that they should not be allowed tlle knowledge that tlley are moral persons at all. 5 Doing so would encourage those in the original position to adopt principles that would protect nonhuman animals, without the absurd requirement that they must formulate these principles using only the limited capacities of such animals. It is as if Rawls recognizes that sophisticated intellectual ability should not be a morally relevant characteristic in determining just treatment, and so sets up tlle original position to make sure tllat it will not be favored by the chosen principles. Buthe simply assumes without argument tllat being a rational (though not necessarily moral) agent or moral person is morally relevant, and hence allows that information to be accessible, even under the veil of ignorance. In VanDeVeer's words:
Should not the veil of ignorance exclude tlle knowledge that members of tlle society [i.e., all individuals whose treatment is dictated by the principles chosen in the original position] will have a concept of their good or of justice? .. The rationale of a veil of ignorance, on Rawls's own view, is to guarantee impartial consideration of principles. 6 If VanDeVeer is correct, Rawls has no adequate justification for assuming that the original position should allow those choosing the principles to proceed on the assumption that they will be moral persons; indeed, such an assumption would lead to just the sort of self-interested prejudice that the veil of ignorance was meruIt to prevent. If they are not entitled to tllat assumption, VanDeVeer suggests tllat they would choose different principles: tlley might choose principles which preclude treatment of any sentient creature (not posing a serious threat to others) which would render no life at all for tllat creature, on balance, ...preferable to its living. I call tllis the LifePreferability Principle.?
In short, the problem to be addressed is whetller it is legitimate to justify one's choice of principles by appeal to an original position in which tile participants are allowed to assume that tiley are/will be moral persons, as tilat concept is defined by Rawls. Going back to our second and tilird strategies, we can first ask whetiler tile Rawlsian framework provides any reason for doing so and, second, consider whetiler abandoning Rawls at tilis point yields a more satisfactory tileory. VanDeVeer does not distinguish tilese two tactics, but since I shall argue tilat tile first will not work, he can at best hope for tile second.
To determine how a Rawlsian might respond to VanDeVeer's challenge, we must go back to an essential aspect of Rawls's starting point: his rejection of utilitarianism. I do not wish to re-examine his reasons for that rejection here but merely to note timt it is essential to his tileory: any attempt to extend or modify tile description of tile original position in a Rawlsian spirit must be consistent with that rejection of utilitarianism. More specifically, tile entire idea of an original position and tile veil of ignorance is presented as an alternative to utilitarianism; therefore, any criticism of Rawls's strategy must be consistent witil tile rejection of utilitarianism iliat motivates tile strategy, or else must reach furtiler and attack the anti-utilitarian arguments on which tile original position is based.
We can frame tile same point in a more positive light. Describing tile original position is tile second step in an argument which begins by arguing tilat a tileory of justice must, above all, be structured so as to avoid what Rawls has already argued is the main flaw of utilitarianism: tile failure to respect individuality. Rawls seems to assume what otilers have argued for: to respect individuality one must reject the idea tilat it is rational (rationally obligatory?) to have no or less interest in tile fulfillment ofone's own desires as in the fulfillment of anotiler being's equally strong interest.
If one rejects utilitarianism in favor of respect for individuality, one moves inevitably, as Rawls does, toward a system which protects the individual's ability to choose and carry out his/her own plans, to further her/his own purposes. In Rawls, this is carried one step furtiler: the sense of individuality which carries moral weight involves having and caring about a life-plan. Thus, he defines moral persons as having "a conception of tileir good (as expressed by a rational plan of life)" (TOJ, p. 505, my emphasis). Whether all of tilese conclusions follow from a rejection of utilitarianism remains to be seen, but that is how, in Rawls, the notion of moral personhood is developed and how it comes to Between the Species be built into tile description of tile original position. The choice and ordering of tile two principles ofjustice is then no surprise, since the original position is intended to reflect tilis prior commitment to tile moral significance of an ability to act as an individual, more specifically an ability to choose and act on a life-plan of one's own. This emphasis on individuality is, again, sometiling that classical utilitarianism is supposed to be unable to accommodate. 8 All of this suggests tilree possible criticisms of Rawls:
1. He has not adequately justified his first step, the rejection of utilitarianism in favor of a tileory tilat puts primary weight on freedom and moral personhood.
2. The description of tile original position does not follow from tile first step, and cannot be justified by appeal to it.
3. There is an inconsistency in the overall argument, and tile burden of proof is on Rawls, not tile critic, to diagnose tile source of tile problem.
The first criticism might lead us to abandon some basic elements of tile Rawlsian view and perhaps follow tile tilird strategy described at tile beginning of tilis paper. The second criticism leads naturally to tile second strategy, and the third criticism follows tile first strategy. Let us consider each of these in tum.
The first-a frontal attack on Rawls's rejection of utilitarianism, and his consequent emphasis on respect for tile individual agent or subject-is certainly open to fierce debate, as demonstrated by numerous commentators on Rawls. Moreover, it is not limited to concerns about animals: tile controversy will not center on tile exclusion of animals but, ratiler, on general considerations for or against utilitarianism.
Despite its apparent attractiveness, I propose not to evaluate this tactic. My primary justification fordoing so is that the criticisms leveled against Rawls's exclusion of animals have not objected specifically to this aspect of the argument. Two otiler reasons reinforce this inclination. First, any dispube over tilis starting point is not peculiar to concerns about animals: it can be, and has been, raised purely within tile context of duties, obligations, and justice toward anyone or anything who is not a moral person in the relevant sense-and tilis would include some human beings. Therefore, such an objection would not support the specific charge of speciesism. Second, several debates within the "ethics and animals" literature serve to reinforce the Rawlsian line that utilitarianism (at least in its classical guise) pays insufficient attention to the status of the individual. Regan's emphasis on the moral status ofbeing a "subject of a life"9 and even Peter Singer's qualified position on replaceabilitylO move us in a direction congenial to Rawls's first premise. The sense of "individuality" (as opposed to merely being a receptacle of pleasurable experiences) which is morally relevant is sure to be hotly debated, but until one argues (as someone like Regan might want toll but has not explicitly done) that Rawls has set the standard for "subject" too high, this first method of attack on Rawls must be discounted.
The second strategy would be to argue that Rawls's rejection of utilitarianism does not justify the most common interpretation of the description of the original position: that it does not warrant allowing those in the original position to assume that they will not be 'incarnated' as nonhuman animals. I think this complaint is correct but achieves only a very minor victory for two reasons. Rawls himself emphasizes moral personhood, not biological facts about membership in the species Homo sapiens, as a crucial factor. 12
Thus, a few nonhuman animals, perhaps dolphins or gorillas, might be capable of fonnulating a rational life plan and valuing it because it is their own life plan; they would thereby qualify as the sort of beings that participants in the original position ought to include in their considerations. Nonetheless, the best scientific evidence we have to date would indicate that this is a plausible hypothesis only with a very small number of species: it will not, for example, save the veal calf or the laboratory rat. Elliot does not think this is an obstacle to including animals, because we can still "think ourselves into their position" and make reasonable inferences about what sort of life would be preferable to and for them. I 3 This, however, misses the point: the issue is not whether nonhuman animals prefer one sort of life to another but whether the very choosing of a life-plan of one's own is important to them.
According to Rawls's argument, those in the original position, even though they do not know what their lifeplan will be, are supposed to know that they will have a rational life plan, i.e., to know that following plan A rather than plan B matters simply because one has chosen A rather than B. 14 This, as noted earlier, is
Fall 1992 presented as a consequence of the rejection of utilitarianism. Once one grants that much, it follows that those in the original position are justified in assuming that they will not be reincarnated as anything other than a human being or perhaps a member of one of a very select and limited group of species. As hinted at above, there may be a sense of "individuality" which at the same time preserves the force of the objection to utilitarianism while at the same time demanding less than Rawls demands of moral persons, but such amiddle ground has not been successfully delineated. IS The third strategy in attacking Rawls is simply to point out an inconsistency and leave it to the Rawlsian to decide how to fix it. Those who have pursued this course have identified such an inconsistency, the discussion of so-called "marginal cases".16 Although the inconsistency is real, the modification of Rawls's position on this point that seems most consistent with his overall theory is not one that results in animals being considered in the original position.
The tenn "marginal cases" refers to human beings who are so severely retarded or brain damaged that they lack the most rudimentary ability to make conscious, deliberate, rational choices. We can restrict the field even further by specifying that they are individuals who never had such abilities, and have no realistic chance ofever acquiring them, since individuals in the original position may want to take into account the fact that they will start life as helpless infants and may be the subject of an accident or disease that could destroy their ability to function as a moral person (TOI, pp. 248-250). Such "marginal cases" are clearly less able to construct or follow a life plan than a pig or a hamster,17 yet Rawls still accords them protection that he does not extend to nonhuman animals. It should be noted immediately that Rawls's discussion of this topic is both tentative and equivocal (TOI pp. 248-250, 506-510). If we accept his critics' assumption that those in the original position would extend the principles of justice to aU human beings, even marginal cases, then Rawls is guilty of inconsistency. But the inconsistency is easily remedied, if indeed it is supported by the text at all. Given Rawls's commitment to liberty, moral personhood, and the importance of freedom to choose, the only solution consistent with a Rawlsian framework would be to accept that marginal cases are not included in considerations of justice. This, however, should not horrify us, because it does not leave marginal cases without any moral protection. Rawls takes pains to admit that the theory of justice is not meant as a complete moral theory (1DJ, p. 512) and we might well have many good reasons for extending special protection to marginal cases. IS The possibility for inconsistency exists, in that the full but as yet unarticulated moral theory could turn out to accord protection to marginal cases lhat it denies to animals without sufficient reason, but that hypothetical possibility does not pose a serious threat to the theory of justice as presented by Rawls.
To sum up: we can describe a theory of justice that is consistent in both letter and spirit with Rawls's that has the following characteristics:
1. Rawls is justified in specifying that all those in the original position may assume that they will be moral persons in the society to be governed by the principles which they choose. Thus, the principles of justice which they choose might easily tum out not to cover many who are not moral persons.
2. Nonetheless, some individuals who are not included as moral persons, or (not necessarily equivalently) those to whom the principles of justice apply, may be moral subjects: our complete moral theory of duties and obligations may show that we have direct moral duties toward some who are not moral persons, e.g. marginal cases and nonhuman animals.
3. It is not a foregone conclusion that marginal cases and nonhuman animals cannot be accorded differential treatment without lapsing into speciesism, but any attempt to justify differential treaunent must still be produced. pp. 83-88. Fuchs argues that Rawls's account of natural duties does not include the duty not to be cruel to animals. Although Rawls does acknowledge that duty elsewhere (TOJ, p. 512), it is not a natural duty in the sense Regan is worried about. As Fuchs points out, Rawls states several times that his theory of justice was never intended to be a complete moral theory and strongly suggests that our treatment of animals might well be restricted by moral principles which, while valid, fall outside the scope of a theory of justice. S Rawls takes the necessary and sufficient conditions for moral personhood to be something like: (a) having one's own ends, a conception of one's own good, or a life plan and an interest in following it, and (b) having the capacity for a sense of justice (p. 505; cf pp. 12, 19). We shall see presently that this definition of "moral person" is fraught with difficulties.
It should be emphasized at the outset, however, that moral personhood is not restricted by definition to anyone biological species; nor is it equivalent to "moral subject." That is, Rawls's argument allows for the possibility that beings who are not Homo sapiens might be moral persons and explicitly agrees that we have moral obligations that are owed to beings who are not moral persons in his sense.
6VanDeVeer, pp. 371-372. It should be noted that, at least in principle, VanDeVeer's notion of "members of society" is broader than Rawls's "moral person". It is certainly logically possible that participants in the original position might decide
